Acting Secretary of State’s wire to US Mission at the UN
During past week British Embassy has repeatedly pressed Dept support UK suggestion with Graham that he get Nehru and Nazimuddin face-to-face on Kashmir. Britian has expressed view that for Graham to continue merely as go-between will freeze GOP and GOI positions and prevent successful agreement of demilitarization. Dept has pointed out to Britian that if 2 PMs meet before Graham has exhausted all possibilities private mediation, PMs’ positions under public pressure might freeze even more quickly. Dept has indicated while having no objection to Graham’s getting 2 PMs together, if he so desires, wisdom such meeting is for him determine. Dept’s reservations re such meeting are as following:
A. Purpose such meeting is not clear and we believe 2 PMs should not meet re Kashmir unless objective of meeting clearly established and something like agenda agreed upon. While possible 2 PMs would be willing get together merely to discuss 2 major outstanding differences in Graham’s 12 point program, i.e., quantum troops remain each side cease fire line end of demilitarization and date for appointment Plebiscite Administrator, we feel such high ranking meeting for such purpose would be trying kill ant with baseball bat.
· B. If purpose meeting 2 PMs is effect quick political settlement of Kashmir dispute, it should come only after quite clear present UN efforts reach agreed demilitarization program cannot succeed. SC has made no such assumption, nor has Graham. Effect of such meeting therefore would be that India would feel entitled believe it relieved of obligation to reach agreement pursuant to UNCIP res on demilitarization and state-wide plebiscite. Presenting opportunity to India at this time to avoid agreement pursuant to UNCIP obligations will wipe out effect of UN efforts during past year.
· C. Graham has indicated repeatedly his conviction his duty is effect demilitarization per Mar 30, 1951 res. He understands he has other rights and powers than those merely relating to demilitarization but believes demilitarization is priority obligation.
2. In view above, Dept believes you should inform Graham Dept’s views re proposed meeting, indicating to him our belief attempting to get 2 PMs together entirely up to him. Dept assumes that UK Del will present UK point of view to Graham when he is in NY early part next week.
3. USUN at its discretion may discuss our reservations re meeting of 2 PMs with UK Del. In so doing should indicate, as Dept is with British Embassy, we open to persuasion if UK can convince us re chances success such meeting and can indicate ideas re logical course of action in event meeting 2 PMs fails.
4. Dept does not dismiss idea meeting 2 PMs at some time in future but, unless Graham desires such meeting, we believe it premature. Dept’s present thinking is that meeting of 2PMs might follow as logical step to SC action on Graham’s final report if he reports failure.