1953: Washington Cables US Mission at UN

“Reference (to) Kashmir: (The) following are (the State) Department’s present views (with regard) to next steps, which views we believe should be conveyed to UK Delegation and Graham:
1. We believe it advisable that (the) Kashmir dispute not be debated in (the) Security Council during (the) months of March and April if debate can be avoided. Pakistan has presidency in March and in view of (its) role in (the) dispute, (it) must turn the chair over to (the) USSR.  (The) USSR has presidency in April.

2. With this in mind we believe Graham should submit (a) factual account of negotiations just concluded in Geneva going as far as indicating failure and (the) nature of impasse. We urge he not submit any conclusions or recommendations but in (the) covering letter to (the) President of (the) (Security) Council (while) submitting (his) report he should indicate his intention to submit such conclusions and recommendations in (the) near future. In following this procedure we believe pressure on Zafrullah from his government will be sufficiently lessened so that there will be no necessity for his calling (a) Council meeting during Pakistani presidency.

3. About 3 weeks after submission of (his) report, Graham might assess (the) likelihood of Indians and Pakistanis having further negotiations with him. After this assessment he would then be in a position to make his conclusions and recommendations which might be submitted to the Security Council in (the) early part of April.

4. If Graham is under such pressure that he believes it necessary to submit conclusions and recommendations now it is our present view that he should not make recommendations relating to specific numbers of armed forces. We believe that any conclusions or recommendations, while not foreclosing further pressure on parties toward (the) implementation of UNCIP resolutions, may raise question(s) (about the) wisdom of (the) Council pursuing further (the) demilitarization program as the only avenue toward(s) (a) solution of (the) dispute. We also think Graham might consider making recommendation(s) following up (on) his proposal made at Geneva for consultations by (the) UN Representative to determine conditions for free expressions of (the) will of the people. Such recommendation(s) might open (the) door for new suggestions, including plans other than for state-wide plebiscite.
Dulles”

1975: Sher-e-Kashmir Becomes CM
The Sher-e-Kashmir became the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir with Congress support. He took oath at Jammu in a simple function.

1966: India, Pak Agree to Withdraw Troops by Feb 25
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed  (in the Tashkent Declaration) that all armed personnel of the two countries would be withdrawn (from Jammu and Kashmir), not later than February 25, 1966, to the positions they held prior to August 5, 1965 and both sides would observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.