The death of forensic experts and personnel in a police station blast underscores the non-negotiable need for specialised facilities, trained teams, and strict adherence to HAZMAT norms. This article positions itself as both an urgent reflection and a constructive open letter- addressed simultaneously to the forensic community, the Government of Jammu & Kashmir, and the Central Government. Its particular emphasis lies on the systems, protocols, and decision-making processes governing the handling, transportation, storage, and scientific examination of explosive precursors and hazardous materials.
By Dr Sami Ullah
The dismantling of the alleged ‘white-collar terror module’ and the recovery of nearly 2,900 kg of bomb-making material in Haryana, including 350 kg of highly unstable explosive precursors, represent a grave national security challenge. The suspected link to the Delhi blast further underscores the lethal sophistication of the network and the evidentiary importance of the recovered cache. Subsequent interstate transportation of this volatile material from Haryana to Nowgam demands urgent scrutiny.
Ammonium nitrate-based mixtures are inherently sensitive to heat, friction, and mechanical shock, making their long-distance movement a high-risk operation that must strictly comply with national and international HAZMAT, disaster-management, and dangerous-goods transport standards. Such transfers ordinarily require certified containment, controlled environmental conditions, specialised escort teams, and continuous scientific oversight.
In the absence of a clear indication that these safeguards were comprehensively in place, serious questions arise regarding procedural prudence, inter-agency coordination, and overarching risk governance. These concerns are not administrative technicalities but largely strike at the heart of public safety, investigative integrity, and the duty of the State to protect life while upholding the rule of law. Ensuring rigorous scientific and procedural adherence is therefore indispensable, not only for justice but for preventing avoidable tragedy.
The tragic explosion that struck Nowgam on the night of 14 November 2025, killing and injuring multiple individuals, will hereafter stand as one of the most devastating procedural failures in recent forensic and policing history. At the time of the incident, confiscated explosive materials, transported earlier from Haryana and stored inside the Police Station Nowgam as case property, were undergoing sampling and preliminary scientific examination. Present on-site were an Executive Magistrate, FSL laboratory assistants, Crime Branch officials, a police duty inspector, a prisoner, and a civilian tailor. The sudden detonation not only claimed lives but obliterated trained forensic personnel whose specialised expertise formed an irreplaceable pillar of the criminal justice system. The blast also destroyed critical evidence, rupturing the chain of custody and compromising the scientific foundation of an ongoing terrorism investigation. This tragedy highlights the grave risks of conducting examinations of volatile explosive precursors in non-specialised, non-hardened environments lacking blast resistance, environmental controls, and controlled sampling infrastructure. It raises urgent questions about whether established explosive-handling protocols, HAZMAT norms, environmental safeguards, and risk-mitigation procedures were adequately followed. Above all, the incident underscores the indispensable need for rigorous scientific oversight, specialised facilities, and trained explosive-ordnance professionals whenever unstable or highly reactive materials are recovered, transported, stored, or examined.
Being formally trained and professionally experienced in forensic science and in the spirit of safeguarding the larger national interest, while fully respecting the ongoing investigation and without encroaching upon its operational confidentiality, it becomes not merely appropriate but ethically imperative and scientifically unavoidable for me to raise a fundamental question: Was the long-distance transportation and subsequent storage of such high risk explosive precursors inside a police station environment procedurally justified, scientifically sound, legally defensible, and compliant with established national and international safety standards governing hazardous materials?
Explosive precursors such as ammonium nitrate, fuel components, oxidisers, and detonable mixtures are internationally classified under Hazard Class 1 (Explosives). Their handling is bound by strict protocols requiring controlled-temperature storage, separation from ignition sources, specialised containment systems, and certified and trained personnel with explosive-handling authorisation. Notably, these requirements are not optional but have been codified under multiple regulatory frameworks (including HAZMAT, UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, and India’s Explosives Rules, 2008).
While the investigative answers are apparently nowhere a second question of critical concern emerges: Were the personnel tasked with sampling including lab assistants functioning as FSL experts, the Executive Magistrate, crime scene photographers, and police officials formally trained, adequately briefed, and sufficiently experienced to safely manage the volatile explosive substances stored inside a fully functional police station rather than a blast-safe, controlled facility? Under established forensic and counter-IED protocols, sampling and examination of unstable explosive materials must be conducted in secure explosive-containment laboratories or bomb-disposal units equipped with blast-proof chambers, remote handling tools, fume extraction systems, and environmental controls.
Storing nearly three tonnes of seized materials, including 350 kg of active explosive precursors, inside a police station that routinely interacts with the public and is surrounded by private structures raises profound concerns regarding procedural prudence, risk-mitigation strategy, and inter and intra-agency coordination.
Recalling the intrinsic chemical and physical properties of explosive substances such as ammonium nitrate and associated precursor mixtures, it is scientifically well-established that these materials exhibit heightened sensitivity to friction, temperature fluctuations, mechanical shock, static charge, and even minor contamination. Such characteristics render these substances acutely prone to accidental initiation when handled outside rigorously controlled conditions. For this reason, standard explosive-handling protocols worldwide mandate the use of controlled environmental settings, specialised containment systems, certified explosive magazines, blast-resistant storage units, and trained bomb-disposal or explosive-ordnance (EOD) experts at every stage of transportation, storage, classification, and forensic sampling.
Within this scientific framework, a third critical question of grave concern that cannot be ignored arises: Had an accidental or intentional detonation occurred during the interstate movement of nearly three tonnes of explosive material from Haryana to Srinagar, the consequences would have been catastrophic. The potential fallout, including large-scale civilian and official casualties, destruction of public infrastructure, environmental contamination, and disruption of key transport corridors, would have extended far beyond the immediate transit pathway. Such an occurrence would also have triggered complex legal, administrative, and inter-jurisdictional questions concerning responsibility, coordination, procedural oversight, and chain-of-custody integrity. This underscores significant vulnerabilities in the current national framework for handling high-risk materials during counter-terrorism operations.
In the backdrop of these pressing questions, this article warrants due consideration from the concerned. Importantly, while the present Nowgam incident is undergoing official inquiry, the principle of accountability remains central. The scientific handling of explosive materials, including secure transport, structured caretaking, standardised sampling, and regulated storage, is not a procedural formality but a life-preserving safeguard designed precisely to prevent tragedies of this magnitude. Strict compliance with HAZMAT and explosive-management protocols is indispensable to protect investigators, first responders, magistrates, police personnel, administrative staff, and the wider public. It is worth to submit here that in judicial proceedings, although courts accept evidence that is corroborated and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the very foundation of evidentiary reliability depends on robust forensic processes. Thus, the death of trained forensic lab personnel whose analysis, interpretation and reporting form the scientific backbone of criminal investigations constitutes an irreplaceable institutional loss. Equally heartbreaking is the loss of police personnel, the Executive Magistrate and his assistant, and a prisoner and innocent civilian, with each casualty representing the disappearance of specialised expertise, institutional, familial or societal memory, and invaluable human capability essential to the justice-delivery system.
While writing this article, another question having consequential scientific concerns found its way: What becomes of the evidence that was destined for judicial examination? When explosive materials detonate during sampling or storage, the consequences extend beyond immediate destruction. Such explosions annihilate primary evidence, contaminate or disperse secondary material, distort chemical and trace signatures, obliterate forensic markers, and critically weaken the chain of custody. This erosion of evidentiary integrity poses profound challenges for investigative accuracy and judicial scrutiny, particularly in terrorism-related cases, where the evidentiary threshold is exceptionally high and where the strength of evidence often determines prosecution outcomes.
A meaningful inquiry must therefore move beyond determining the immediate technical cause of the explosion. It must critically assess whether scientific protocols, explosive-handling guidelines, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) regulations, and inter-agency coordination frameworks were fully followed, partially adhered to, or inadvertently bypassed at any stage of the process. Equally essential is the fixing of responsibility, both institutional and individual, so that accountability becomes not only a procedural requirement but also a preventive safeguard against future lapses.
These reflections are not criticisms in the adversarial sense. Rather, they constitute professional imperatives grounded in a collective responsibility to ensure that scientific investigation, carried out in the service of the rule of law, advances without any negligence, ensuring maximum safeguards for human life and property. Strengthening procedural rigour is therefore indispensable, not merely for the integrity, continuity, and admissibility of evidence, but more importantly for the safety of forensic experts, police personnel, magistrates, and civilians who often operate in high-risk operational environments.
In light of the foregoing analysis, this article positions itself as both an urgent reflection and a constructive open letter- addressed simultaneously to the forensic community, the Government of Jammu & Kashmir, and the Central Government. Its particular emphasis lies on the systems, protocols, and decision-making processes governing the handling, transportation, storage, and scientific examination of explosive precursors and hazardous materials. Finally, it calls for immediate institutional introspection, policy recalibration, capacity enhancement, and the adoption of global best practices, ensuring that such preventable tragedies never recur and that the lives of experts, officers, and civilians are safeguarded through scientifically robust and operationally sound procedures.
Following this reflection, and in recognition of the urgent need to bridge existing procedural gaps, the following recommendations are proposed for immediate and thoughtful consideration. These measures aim to fortify explosive-handling norms, enhance forensic safety, and strengthen investigation protocols across Jammu & Kashmir and the wider national framework. Each recommendation aligns with global scientific standards and operational best practices, ensuring that the protection of life, the integrity of evidence, and the pursuit of justice remain paramount.
- Establish dedicated, licensed explosive storage facilities
All confiscated explosive materials must be stored exclusively in certified explosive magazines rather than police stations or administrative offices. These specialised facilities should be equipped with blast-proof enclosures, controlled temperature and humidity systems, shock-resistant flooring, fire-suppression mechanisms, and remote surveillance/monitoring units. Creating such infrastructure across districts will eliminate the dangerous practice of temporarily housing bulk explosives in police premises, thereby minimising risk to personnel, property, and nearby civilian populations.
- Introduce mandatory hazard material risk assessment before transportation
Before any inter-state or intra-state movement of explosive materials, a structured and scientific hazard material risk assessment must be made legally mandatory. This assessment should be jointly conducted by FSL explosive experts, Bomb Disposal Units (BDU), and HAZMAT specialists. The evaluation must consider chemical stability, contamination risks, quantity, packaging integrity, environmental exposure, and route vulnerabilities. Only after collective clearance from these experts, transportation be authorised. This step will ensure evidence safety, personnel protection, and fool foolproof chain of custody during transit.
- Create joint explosive response teams
A dedicated tri-agency Joint Explosive Response Team should be institutionalised, comprising experts from the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU), and NIA/State Counter-Terror Units. This integrated team should oversee all stages of explosive handling, including recovery, transportation, storage, sampling, forensic examination, and final disposal. Such a coordinated mechanism would eliminate fragmented responsibility, ensure scientific oversight from the very outset, and strengthen operational efficiency during high-risk explosive investigations.
- Adopt best standards for handling explosives
Given the complex threat landscape in Jammu & Kashmir, the adoption of internationally benchmarked standards for handling, transporting, and examining explosive materials is essential. These standards must mirror best practices followed under frameworks for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG), UN Hazard Class 1 regulations, NATO counter-IED guidelines, and INTERPOL explosive safety protocols. Implementation of this should include: use of specialised explosive-grade containers for transit and evidence storage, real-time GPS tracking for all explosive consignments, deployment of escort/security vehicles for high-risk movements, comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation at every handling point and mandatory use of PPE, contamination-control procedures, and environmental monitoring during sampling and examination.
- Mandatory use of portable explosive containment vessels (ECVs)
The deployment of portable Explosive Containment Vessels (ECVs) should be made compulsory for the movement, temporary storage, and preliminary examination of confiscated explosive materials. ECVs widely adopted across Europe and other high-risk jurisdictions are engineered to withstand accidental detonation, thereby preventing blast propagation and minimising casualties and infrastructural damage. Their mandatory adoption, particularly in terror-affected regions like Jammu & Kashmir, would substantially enhance operational safety during transport and forensic processing of explosive evidence.
- Introduce forensic safety training for police and magistracy
Strengthening procedural integrity and reducing operational hazards, it is imperative to institutionalise structured forensic safety training programmes for police personnel, executive magistrates, and other officers involved in explosive-handling duties. Such training should focus on: hazard identification and recognition, risk mitigation strategies, safe sampling and evidence-handling protocols, emergency response and evacuation procedures and chain-of-custody requirements in explosive cases. Annual certification and recertification modules must be mandated to ensure that all stakeholders remain updated on evolving explosive technologies, counter-IED threats, and best-practice forensic methodologies. This will foster a culture of scientific awareness, operational discipline, and safety readiness across all field-level actors.
- Restore and digitally preserve evidence
To safeguard evidentiary integrity, particularly in situations where physical evidence may be partially compromised or completely destroyed, there is a pressing need to adopt digital evidence reconstruction frameworks. This should include: high-resolution 3D mapping and photogrammetry of recovered explosive materials, comprehensive photographic and videographic inventories at every handling stage, spectrometric and chromatographic profiling preserved in digital forensic databases, and creation of a secure, timestamped digital chain-of-custody archive. 8. Establish explosive safe examination labs in every division: Given J&K’s repeated exposure to explosions, IED recoveries, and terrorism-related operations, the establishment of division-level explosive-safe forensic laboratories is no longer optional but is an operational necessity. These facilities should include: blast-resistant examination chambers, controlled environment explosive-analysis rooms, miniature explosive chemistry units for preliminary and confirmatory testing, dedicated regional FSL extensions staffed with trained explosive experts, and mobile forensic explosive laboratories for on-site analysis in remote or conflict-prone districts. Such infrastructure would dramatically reduce the need for long-distance transportation of volatile materials, thereby lowering transit-related risks, enhancing scientific turnaround time, and enabling safer, more efficient evidence processing at or near the recovery site.
- Strengthen accountability mechanisms
While the Government of Jammu & Kashmir has rightly initiated a probe, meaningful accountability must extend beyond routine inquiry. The magnitude of loss of skilled expertise, personnel, and critical infrastructure necessitates a comprehensive, multi-tiered accountability framework. This should include: independent audits of all explosive-handling, storage, and transportation procedures, a clearly documented responsibility matrix identifying decision-makers at each stage, mandatory review of authorisation chains, risk assessments, and storage approvals, and disciplinary and procedural action against any officials found to have violated or bypassed standard protocols. Such measures are essential not as punitive tools but as systemic corrections to ensure that similar lapses do not recur and that institutional learning is formally embedded into future operations.
- Ensure psychological and welfare support for affected departments, families and all the concerned
. The incident has inflicted deep psychological trauma on forensic professionals, police personnel, magistrates, civilian staff, and the families of those who tragically lost their lives. To restore institutional resilience and human well-being, the Government must implement an immediate post-incident welfare and psychological support programme, including: trauma-informed counselling and mental-health services, dedicated grief support and financial assistance for bereaved families, professional rehabilitation programs for affected departments to rebuild operational capacity, long-term wellness monitoring for officers and forensic staff routinely exposed to high-risk environments. Such interventions are critical not only for individual recovery but also for restoring confidence, morale, and preparedness across the forensic and law-enforcement ecosystem.
About the writer
Dr Sami Ullah is a Forensic practitioner and Anthropologist with an MSc and PhD in Forensic Science and an MA in Anthropology. As Co-Founder & Chairman of the RADISAT Foundation, he advocates for Forensic science education, real-time justice reforms and scientific and research advancements in crime investigation and scientific reporting. Passionate about bridging the forensic science gap in Jammu & Kashmir, he works to integrate forensic science into academia, industry, the private sector, law enforcement and governance.
sa********@***il.com