The book elaborates the Chinese nature of exceptionalism, and is completely in contrast with American Exceptionalism

If there is any one word that can be used to describe Henry Kissinger, in popular parlance, it is ‘scoundrel’. Scoundrel, because of the kind of diplomatic faux passes and machinations he has been involved in the last half-a-century. But like any other person in the history of humans, he has hundreds of conspicuous aspects to him. Amongst his brilliance is his ability to teach through his penning. He is insightful on history and resourceful in perspective.
Before becoming the State Secretary of the United States of America and National Security Advisor, he had been an academic at Harvard University, teaching Foreign Affairs. Perhaps that stint helped him in gleaning his knowledge of diplomacy and realpolitik. (Diplomacy for hegemonic powers is pure war-mongering). He is 99, to be 100 this year. His career under wide-brimmed hats of military, teaching, foreign affairs, writing and geostrategic consultations spans more than seven decades. He has his high points and pitfalls, more so the latter, in each of them.
At an individual level, he is surely one of the best writers on anything under the umbrella of International Relations, especially involving the United States of America as a dominant power from the 1970s till 1991, and the only hyperpower from 1991 till 2008. He has written more than two dozen books on themes like his life, the Vietnam War, World Order, Nuclear Weapons, China, Artificial Intelligence and leadership. More than a decade ago, I had been suggested Henry Kissinger’s book ‘On China’ by an acquaintance, but it was only in recent months that I have been able to put my hands on it.
China, like any other part of the world, is a rich history of civilization, development and persistent documentation. Highly inward-looking, surmisingly harping on its rich notions of self-sufficiency and smugness, China seems, largely, to be a country in which conjecturing matters more to the building of narratives from outside, less the concrete knowledge of things about it. ‘On China’ is a slightly longish book, of around 600 pages. While it deals primarily with the period from 1969 till the year 2010, it gives a good exposition of the pattern of how China has been working through the ages.
The book has elaborated upon the Chinese nature of exceptionalism, being based on the strong core of historical and cultural, from which emanate the circles of Chinese thought. It is completely in contrast with American Exceptionalism, which is based on taking their values far and wide in order to make the world order their own. It makes it explicit that China doesn’t go on a war spree for the sake of aggression. China believes in retaining its own, believing itself to be the centre of gravity of the world. The book deals with the art of Chinese realpolitik, Confucian thought, Wei qi strategy ( a game of surrounding pieces), devised by China to strategically encircle the opponent and Sun Tzu’s Art of War in a very unique manner. One gets to learn about the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), the Macartney Mission, The Kowtow question, the Taiping Rebellion, the Mandate of Heaven and the Opium War. In this sense, the book enlightens in very concise terms the development of China through different labyrinths of history.
In the subsequent chapters, it weaves through the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty by Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Party, (Kuomintang) and the events of what the Chinese call the Century of Humiliation. The narrative around the events from the mid-19th century till 1949, the year of the Chinese Revolution, renders the period to be one of disappointment and degradation of the Chinese role and potential to emerge for itself and the world.
From 1949 onwards, the book gives a reader a peep into the China-Soviet Union relations, the perceived insult to Mao Zedong by Joseph Stalin on the former’s visit to Moscow, Korean War, Taiwan Crisis and China-United States mutual discommunication for more than 2 decades. The best part of the book is its ‘stick to the theme’ nature. That allows the book to remain steadfast and deep about China. The survival instincts of China are clearly evident everywhere while testing the multiple facets of the adversary’s strategies.
Mao Zedong, his doctrinaire dogmatism on communist thought, the Hundred Flowers campaign, the great leap forward, agricultural collectivization and the resultant drought, which led to at least 25 million deaths, have been explored brilliantly. Zhou Enlai has been given a very high place in having enabled China to defreeze its relations with the United States of America (USA). Mao’s purges of his fellow comrades, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping and thousands of others have been followed up thoroughly.
The book elucidates how the détente from 1969 onwards between USA and China was a very arduous and protracted process. Any move wrong could have easily led to the chief negotiators’ lives and careers going into jeopardy. Here Henry Kissinger’s skills in negotiations with China come to the fore. His interactions and visits with the Chinese over the next 30 years (after 1969) have distinguished him to understand China, unlike anybody who waxes eloquent about the latter.
Deng Xiaoping’s adroitness and skill in managing to overcome the Gang of Four and Hua Guofeng have been well-document. China’s attack on Vietnam in 1980 and the ensuing double-handedness in handling the USA during this period is properly explained. Deng’s moves to open up China to the world and his pairing up with Hu Yaobang, Zhao Zhiyang and Zhu Rongjii led to the Chinese economy booming. This led to China becoming an eyesore for the West, who kept on pressing the Western aspirations of democracy for China to little or no avail.
The Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 is one which led to the United States of America pirouetting opposite of China in campaign after campaign. Bill Clinton, from 1992 onwards, led the verbal flag march against China on it. But China devised models, whether they be the thriving of Special Economic Zones, Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) concessions, agricultural reforms, industrial delimitations, etc which beat everybody hollow. The onward gallops were led successfully by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who had risen through the ranks of the Communist Party of China.
All of the above, China’s biding time and wearing the opponent’s patience down, and a lot more are superbly written in the book.
Read it to enjoy it.
4.25 out of 5.0.
The author can be reached at [email protected]

Uzair Qadri