1952: Washington Cables US Mission at UN

“1. After consultation with (the) UK (mission at UN) you should convey to Graham the substance of Karachi’s (telegram) 1178 of April 12.

2. Our comments on (the) reftel (telegram under reference), which you may pass on to Graham, are as follows:

 Graham’s report (to the) GOP (Government of Pakistan) seems (to) assume (that) no mention will be made of (the) intended association of (the) Plebiscite Administrator  with further negotiations  and that there will be no indication whether Graham intends (to) pursue further efforts (to) obtain (the) agreement (of the) parties to quantum of troops, etc. We suspect (the) GOP believes (the) report will merely narrate (the) lack of progress in (the) last negotiations on (the) subcontinent, but will include (a) general indication by Graham (that) he believes (that) troop withdrawals by both sides create (an) atmosphere conducive to further negotiations of no indicated nature.

If this estimate (of the) GOP guess on (the) report (is) correct, we hazard (the) suggestion (that the) GOP, fearing Graham has no intention (to) press (the) GOI (Government of India) further on any points (of) his program, will be prepared (to) reject, if necessary in (the) SC (Security Council), any further negotiations involving (the) UNRIP (United Nations Representative on India and Pakistan). Such rejection, whether or not followed by (the) GOP demand (which would probably fail (to) obtain SC support) for (any) SC action recommending parties (to) carry out (a) plebiscite (as) per UNCIP res(olutions) forthwith, would probably serve publicly to justify (the) GOP “taking matters into their own hands”.

·         C. It seems to us (that the) Pak Foreign Secretary (is) either not sure of his facts (with regard to the) Plebiscite Administrator, or is using his ostensibly distorted impressions re(garding the) Plebiscite Administrator to attempt (to) obtain from Graham, via us, (a) clarification (of)Nimitz precise role in future negotiations. In view of fact that Nimitz has already been approved for Plebiscite Administrator by both GOI and GOP, has been designated Plebiscite Administrator by (the) UNSYG (as) per UNCIP res(olutions), and (the) fact that only (the) GOI may arrange for (the) installation (of the) Plebiscite Administrator, (the) Foreign Secretary’s quibbling over whether Nimitz to be named Plebiscite Administrator or Plebiscite Administrator-Designate strengthens our belief (that giving a) clarification to (the) GOP (with regard to) Nimitz role (being) desirable. We assume such (a) clarification, if given, would be identical with that given (to the) GOI.

(The) Foreign Secretary’s comments lead us to believe that (the) US–UK démarche in Karachi (is) not likely inspire (a) new, more favorable aide-mémoire to Graham from (the) GOP. Rather, (the) GOP seems to intend to make no new move vis-à-vis Graham’s proposals until (his) report (is) made public.

We suggest, therefore, that (the) initiative by Graham vis-à-vis (the) PakDel (Pakistani Delegation) of April 14 might be beneficial, and, while he is obviously (the) best judge (on) how this should be done, we are inclined to volunteer (the) view that (the) PakDel be advised:

    (1) Graham planning (to) postpone (his) report (for a) few days in order (to) give parties adequate time for (a) favorable consideration (of) his proposals.

    (2) He wishes to present to (the) GOP (a) clarification of (the) Plebiscite Administrator’s role.

    (3) (The) views he has presented (with regard to the) necessity (of) bringing (the) Plebiscite Administrator into (the) picture will be (a) part of his report.

         F. We are becoming increasingly concerned that unless Graham’s report carefully details difficulties with either or both parties (with regard to the) quantum of troops (see USUN’s 684, April 8), and (the) installation of (the) Plebiscite Administrator, (his) report will be severely attacked by Pakistan as vague, and pro GOI in view (of his) favorable mention of (the) GOI withdrawing (one) division of (its) troops. (The) GOP and we tend to view this withdrawal more as (a) matter of strategy than good-will. Such (an) attack on (the) report and Graham by (the) GOP might well make (any) possible future negotiations by Graham extremely difficult.

Acheson”