“FYI (For Your Information) (The State) Dep(artmen)t understands (the) GOP (Government of Pakistan) reply (of) April 11 to Graham (with respect to) his proposals not (being) favorable.
On assumption (that) Zafrulla’s remarks to you, when you presented our views in Deptel (State Department telegram) 1029 of April 9, were in (a) similar vein, we request you, if you deem (the) timing and situation appropriate, (to) indicate our concern over (the) GOP position.
3. We suggest your comments might be (the) following:
· A. We know of no more constructive step which can be taken at this time.
· B. We believe continuance (of) Graham’s negotiations (is) not inimical to GOP’s interests.
· C. Acceptance proposals would enable (the) GOP (to) maintain (a) strong position established as (a) result (of) past record (of) firm cooperation with (the) SC (Security Council).
· D. Failure (of) Graham negotiations due (to) parties’ non-acceptance (of) proposals might well jeopardize (the) two UNCIP resolutions.
· E. Bringing (the) Plebiscite Administrator into negotiations now would constitute (a) step forward.
· F. In view (of the) GOP’s known desire for peaceful (a) settlement, we hope (the) GOP will appreciate (the) advantages of accepting Graham’s proposals.
4. You are requested (to) consult with (the) UKHC (UK High Commission) prior (to) making this approach. London (may) please keep in touch with (the British) Foreign Office.”
1956: US Embassy in Pak Wires Washington
“As (the) Embassy reads (the) Delhi telegram, it has unstated (the) premise that India’s intentions to Pakistan are fundamentally pacific and that (the) problem of easing present tensions between (the) two countries is somehow (to) convince (the) Indians that regardless of Pakistani intentions, Pakistani capabilities are and will continue to be too limited to constitute any real threat (to) India. Regardless (of the) merits of this assumption, (the) Embassy points out that it is not widely held in Pakistan and (that the) present GOP would react very negatively to any proposal more or less obviously based on it. (The) Pakistanis are, in fact, deeply suspicious of Indian bona fides, many of them feeling that India (is) not reconciled to (the) existence of independent Pakistan, and, has from (the) time of partition, endeavored (to) isolate Pakistan preparatory (to) absorbing it. Moreover, in view (of the) recent militant Indian activity on (the) frontier, coupled with Nehru’s repudiation of Kashmir plebiscite commitment, it would be difficult convince (the) Pakistanis that India needs (an) assurance (that the) Pakistanis do not threaten Indian security. In point of fact, (the) Pakistan Prime Minister has recently spoken to (the) Ambassador of his serious concern at reports of Indian arms deal with (the) UK which indicates that (the) Indians will receive important offensive weapons on (an) accelerated schedule.