“Pursuant to instructions, USUN (US representatives at UN) called on Graham today at his request. He handed us (a) copy of (the) aide-mémoire (text in immediately following telegram) he gave Indian and Pakistani rep(resentative)s this morning. He said they both received it without outcry and said they would send it to their governments for early reaction.
Graham said (that) he had come to (the) conclusion soon after (his) return to (the) subcontinent that neither India nor Pakistan was willing to give way sufficiently on troop quantum to make compromise on demilitarization possible. At (the) same time, (the) Indian decision to withdraw a division (of troops) means that (a) majority of forces on both sides will be withdrawn. This he construes as bringing (the) demilitarization process to (the) final phase, at which point it merges with (the) phase of establishing prerequisites for holding of plebiscite. (The) purpose of associating plebiscite administrator designate with (the) UNRep (UN Representative for India and Pakistan) in (the) next round of negotiations is to link questions of disarming, disbanding and location of remaining forces with (the) question of withdrawal.
Graham said (that) this idea came from his principal sec(retar)y, Marin. Marin explained (the) proposal further, pointing out that (the) UNRep in (the) final stage of demilitarization would be encroaching on (the) PlebAd’s (Plebiscite Administrator’s) responsibility unless some form of association and joint consultation were established. (The) PlebAd’s functions now would be simply advisory, not executive. He thought this step would be very good for Pakistan as (an) indication to (the) people of real progress towards plebiscite. He thought (that the)proposal (would) also (be) advantageous to India in that if it should develop that plebiscite could not in fact be held, i.e. if agreement on demilitarization is still not forthcoming, (the) PlebAd was (the) only authoritative person to make this finding.
Graham said (that the) task they had set themselves in Geneva was to find (a) device which would keep negotiations moving, bring in new (a) element, and avoid SC (Security Council) debate. He thought (that) they had succeeded. He believes (the) parties will both accept his proposal. He suggested that if (the) proposal commended itself to (the) US, it would be helpful if (the State) Dep(artmen)t should decide to instruct Bowles and Warren to commend (the) proposal to parties.
Graham and his staff did not seem confident that negotiations even with this new approach would succeed. Jackson said (that) if this became apparent after (a) month or two it might be helpful if (an) indication could be given that Graham’s terms of reference were broad enough to permit him to explore (an) alternative. We said (that) we understood (that) Graham was heir to Dixon’s powers and wondered why question arose. Jackson referred to State Dep(artmen)t’s March 29 message to Graham in Geneva (Deptel 742) which suggested (that) Graham might proceed with further negotiations without regard to (the) deadline on (his) report and (the) limitations of (his) terms of reference. Marin said there was also some feeling in (the) secretariat that (the) March 30, 1951 res(olution) limited Graham strictly to 2 UNCIP res(olutions) and did not include Dixon’s terms of reference. We said there was apparently confusion on this point and promised to raise it with (the) (State) Dep(artmen)t.
Regardless of answer on this point, Graham said (that) he had no intention of raising (an) alternative solution at (the) present. Any such suggestion, he said, would send (the) Pakistanis straight through (the) roof.
We told Graham about our representations on (the) sub-continent, on (the) importance of continuing negotiations, and about Zafrullah’s reply (Deptels 1018 to Karachi and 2128 to New Delhi; Karachi’s 1154). He said he was pleased, and encouraged by Zafrullah’s response.