1952: US Ambassador to Pak Cables Washington

Yesterday Graham had lunch with the Governor General, Zafrulla, and Mohammad Ali. He came to see me immed(iately) afterwards. At Australian Foreign Minister Casey’s request, I arranged an interview for him with Graham. Then Casey went to see Zafrulla. He is very anxious to be helpful but Graham told me later that he did not feel he could speak freely with him. Graham came to see me at 4:30 to say goodbye. His plane was due to leave for Geneva at 6:00 but it was delayed and he did not get away until 9:30 this a.m.
The State Department’s (cable) 936 of March 23, 6 p. m. did not reach me until 3:45 a. m. this morning. Immediately after its receipt, I saw Graham and tried to prevail on him as I had yesterday afternoon to reverse his decision to depart for Geneva. He said that he appreciates thoroughly the seriousness and gravity of the present situation arising from the Pak attitude towards his mission, but he has concluded that the best thing for him to do at this time is to prepare his report and get it before the SC (Security Council). He indicated the report will include reference to troop quantum discussions, (but) he was unable to tell the Pakistanis because of possible violation of Indian confidence.
I have asked to see Zafrulla but he will not see me until tomorrow on account of illness. He has also declined to see the UK HC who today received instructions similar to mine.
I regret deeply Graham’s decision to leave at this time. The Pakistanis appear convinced that he did not make (a) specific proposal to (the) GOI (Government of India) on the minimum troops that India would accept in the demilitarization program. They resent what they believe is abandonment of (the) Devers formula without substitution. Zafrulla has been informed in rather intimate details of alleged differences between Graham, Schmidt, and Devers, and believes that the Devers ratio was not utilized in discussions during this visit. I realize the seriousness of such an expression, but I would be failing in my duty if I did not voice it at this time. Notwithstanding the words of caution that have been addressed to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Minister by my British colleague and myself separately and almost continuously over the past few days, I believe they have fallen on deaf ears.
It is no longer in my opinion desirable for the President either alone or with Churchill to appeal to the two Prime Ministers to reconcile their differences. Such an appeal I believe could be made only at the time Graham may submit his report and time may have run out then. I hope the State Department may prevail upon Graham to reconsider his departure and to return here and attempt to obtain from GOI a statement that would at least keep the door open. With Graham’s final departure from the sub-continent, I think the Pakistanis consider that the link with the SC has in effect been broken and that they find themselves alone in the world without a friend and in a position so desperate with respect to their own people that the most catastrophic decision can be entertained without appreciation of disaster that may overtake the area. I realize there may be elements of bluff in this situation to impress the UK and (the) US but I discount them. I do not think the Cabinet has the courage of Liaquat to face a fanatic and disappointed people and call for patience in slow progress.