Telegram from the US Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

1957, January 16

Prime Minister referred to report Nehru had said Pakistan was not really serious about Kashmir and Prime Minister wanted me and USG to understand Pakistan was serious about it and would keep at it for one, five, ten or fifty years until just solution had been reached. He then calmly but deliberately said this was time when Pakistan was going find out who were its friends and who were merely giving lip service. He then became the lawyer and elaborated making following points:

1. There is no room for negotiations on the principle of free plebiscite under auspices UN and were three minimum points that must be made by UN at this time:
(a) reaffirmation support of free plebiscite under UN;
(b) rejection Indian contention that Kashmir situation changed by military aid to Pakistan or by Baghdad Pact; and
(c) reaffirmation of resolutions in such manner as to leave no doubt that UN record would brand Indian attempt annex Kashmir on January 26 as illegal.
2. With the above points as a minimum then there might be room for negotiations on many points.
He then launched into a calm but very serious appraisal of effect of failure of USG to support just position of GOP. It was touched at times with anger and sometimes despondency but the net effect was that the lack of support would have grave effect on GOP and people of Pakistan as far as bonafides of USG and its assertion that it will give a fair deal. It will create grave tensions and hopelessness in minds of Pakistanis affecting many things besides Kashmir issue. It would be considered an unfriendly act with grave repercussions bearing on its foreign policy.
I assured Prime Minister I had not been told exact position of USG and neither had Embassy Delhi. Department wished avoid risk of same words getting two different interpretations at two different capitals. USG position would be made clear in front of both GOP and GOI Representatives in UN.
I pointed out Foreign Minister cable was his interpretation of situation and not statement of USG position and I doubted if USG would merely take position the troublesome issue must be settled by negotiation between the two countries. I ventured opinion that Lodge may have been merely sounding out Noon and not indicating USG position.
Prime Minister said he could understand and sympathize with difficult position of USG but it was question of whether USG was going to support just principles and support its proved friends or succumb to appeasement to power politics.
Comment: If UN satisfies Pakistanis on (a) and (c) Pakistanis probably would be willing forget UN police force; what would be intolerable would be dispatch of UN representative without specific instructions devise methods conduct plebiscite. Among other casualties in GOP and Pakistan public of unsatisfactory or indecisive outcome of Kashmir case will be reputation of UN as a body that can work for peaceful solutions of difficult problems.