1957: US Mission at UN Cables Washington

“Reference Kashmir: Menon (India) called on me yesterday to discuss several questions, including Kashmir. Other subjects reported in separate telegrams.
Menon thought (that the) best action for the Security Council (SC) to take on Kashmir would be no action. He hoped (that) there would be only (a) general round of discussions presenting views on various sides and that no member of the SC would present a resolution. He said (that) India could not accept any resolution (the) SC might adopt, and thought that (the) less (the) question was stirred up the better (it would be). He said (that) Kashmir was not coming before (the) SC as (a) result (of) anything India had done, but probably stemmed from (the) necessity (of the) weak Pakistani Government to seek external (support on the) emotional issue to bolster its position. Menon said (that) India had thought of introducing (a) second item into (the) SC focusing on Pakistan’s aggression, but had decided this would be too tendentious. He would of course make (the) aggression case in his speech.
Menon said (that) India was not prepared to give up any (part) of its legal position on Kashmir. (The) entire state had acceded formally to India in proper form provided for at (the) time (of) partition by (an) agreement between UK, India and Pakistan. (He said that) the Indian constitution, like US, had no provision for secession and there was no possibility (of) India allowing this to happen.
(He said that) if Kashmir were allowed to secede, this might disrupt the unity of (the) Indian state inasmuch as over 500 other states and principalities had acceded to India in (the) same fashion as Kashmir. India’s legal position pertained to (the) entire state and meant that Pakistan should withdraw from areas they illegally control as (a) result (of) aggression. (He), however, (said that) India had no military intentions (with respect to) areas they did not control. On other hand, if the Pakistanis by some miscalculation attacked Indian-held areas of Kashmir, India would have to defend itself and would then feel released from its undertaking not to attempt to take Pakistan-held areas by force. Lall (India) added that in such circumstances India might have to go through Punjab as this was (the) natural military approach to Kashmir. Menon said (that the) best indication of (the) lack (of) Indian military intentions was (the) fact (that) it had done nothing about East Bengal and Goa. He said (that) East Bengal would fall to India if India blew hard and Goa could be taken by six policemen.
Menon said (that the) Indian position was based on two fundamental points – its legal position on (the) Kashmir accession and (the) problem (of) military security. He said (that) he obviously could not make public (the) argument on (the) various security aspects related to Kashmir. India was concerned about (the) stability of (the) Pakistan Govt. There was much leftist tendency in Pakistan and Moslems were very susceptible to Communist doctrines. Pakistan had (a) conservative leftist government now, but it was questionable how long it would last. Next year the government might be leftist and (the) following year Communist. This would cause great concern in India and India had to take special precautions for its security. He reiterated arguments on (the) possibility of Ladakh going to Tibet (see Delga 467) and similar arguments about Baluchistan. He said Moslems in Baluchistan were more similar to (the) Moslems of (the) USSR than those of Pakistan, and said that (the) British had never been able to govern northwest provinces adequately and neither would Pakistanis.
On plebiscite, Menon said that if India were ever foolish enough to agree it would produce communal riots in India and upset Indian efforts to be (a) secular state. He also stressed (on the) great economic progress made in Kashmir, (the) number of visitors there every year, and (the) extent to which it has been economically integrated into India.
He also referred to (the) fact that military aid to Pakistan had changed (the) balance between India and Pakistan which had been at (the) 5–2 ratio at partition. This altered security position had to be taken into consideration by India. He said (that) he did not mean (that the) US had intended to arm Pakistan against India, but that Pakistan had accepted US military aid in order strengthen itself against India. He said (that the) Indian position would be clear on this in (the) debate. He mentioned (the) fact that (the) center (of) Pakistan power was closer to Kashmir than was that of India and that (the) buildup (of the) Pakistan Air Force with American help augmented Pakistan’s strategic position. He also referred to (the) airport in Gilgit which he or Lall said was used by American planes on way to Asia.
Menon also said (that) India was not anxious to rely on (the) Soviet veto in (the) SC for protection. With internal elections coming in India shortly, the Communist Party would utilize such (a) veto as (an) electioneering weapon to persuade voters of (the) strength (of the) Soviet support to India. (The) Congress Party would not like to see this happen. Neither were they anxious to have such (a) result in view (of) their international position. However, it would be difficult for them to reject support on (an) issue on which they thought they were right.”