Politics in Kashmir appears to have been delegated to agencies other than the political class(es) of the state. This can be inferred from the overall condition(s) that define Kashmir. The gravamen of these conditions- quotidian killings and the primacy of the military option over the political- appears to be one indicator over the abdication of politics. The killings which take places during and after encounters between the military, paramilitary and police suggests that these deaths are held to be “collateral damage”. The premise of the powers that be appears to be that killing militants would lead to the resolution of the conflict in and over Kashmir at an “acceptable price”. This amounts to what may be called as “containment” of the conflict. But as the history of the conflict in and over Kashmir , specifically speaking and in general terms, the broader history of conflicts, suggests containment in whatever form or shape- weak or strong- does not work. Moreover, in terms of Kashmir, as the number of people attending militants’ funerals suggest, killings of militants do not deter militancy but encourage it. The larger point , that bears repetition, is that the approach of powers that be accords precedence to the military approach over the political. This is not only odious but will not work if the benchmark goal is peace ( in relative terms) in Kashmir. Peace can and will descend on Kashmir if and when an optimal and prudent approach to the conflict in and over Kashmir will be taken recourse to. Admittedly, this is a hackneyed proposition or formulation but for the paucity of alternatives , there really is no choice. A militarized approach to the conflict can only mean transformation of the conflict as the repercussions of the approach takes its toll on the Kashmiri psyche. A more hardened Kashmiri psyche might lead to a transformation of the conflict, which later might not brook solutions that lend themselves as possible solutions. These essentially are in the nature of a multi stakeholder approaches wherein all stakeholders to the conflict- especially the people of Kashmir- are taken on board and a multi stakeholder paradigm of dispute resolution adopted. Naturally, this entails resolving all dimensions- the conflict and the conflict over- dimensions of the conflict. Any other approach will neither be countenanced by the people of Kashmir and is, in the final analysis, doomed. Let prudence and wisdom instead of reflexive militarization assume precedence.